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Applying the standard method
Generational accounts are calculated in two steps.2 The
first step involves the calculation of the fiscal burdens
on current generations (i.e. the generations that are cur-
rently alive). This is done on the basis of current fiscal rules.
In the second step, the fiscal burdens on the future gen-
erations (i.e. the generations that are not yet born) are
computed as a residual from the intertemporal budget
constraint. This ensures that the present value of future
net tax payments (from present and future generations
combined) equals the governments present net liabilities.
Whereas the fiscal burdens on current generations are
thus entirely based on current fiscal rules, the government
budget constraint determines the fiscal burdens on future
generations. Hence, future generations are assumed to
absorb the entire adjustment that is required to make the
claims of various generations consistent with the intertem-
poral budget constraint. Current generations, in contrast,
fully escape this adjustment.
Current generations
In calculating the fiscal burden facing currently living gen-
erations on the basis of current fiscal rules, one extrapo-
lates the age profile of net contributions (i.e. taxes minus
public transfers (including public expenditures on health
and education, which are imputed to age groups)) into the
future. The shape of the age profile for each spending and
revenue category, which is determined for the base year,
is assumed to remain constant in the future. Figure 1 shows
the age profile of the net contribution to the government
budget. Overall, the young and the elderly benefit from
the public finances, while the middle-aged are net con-
tributors. 
The age profiles can be combined with projections
for the aggregates of each spending and tax component
to determine the fiscal benefits and burden for each age
category. For the period from 1998 to 2000, we adopt the
realised and projected figures for the various aggregate
budget items contained in CPB (1999). For the projections
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Abstract
This article extends the standard methodology for gen-
erational accounting. Moreover, it updates Dutch gen-
erational accounts that were constructed two years
ago. The new results indicate that the generational
imbalance has become somewhat smaller compared
to that found previously. This is due mainly to new
demographic projections, which indicate that the pop-
ulation will age less than expected earlier. As a direct
consequence of the smaller generational imbalance,
the changes in fiscal policy that are required to estab-
lish sustainable public sector arrangements are also
somewhat smaller. However, the Dutch government
will still have to run sizable fiscal surpluses in the com-
ing decades in order to create the budgetary room for
the higher future age-related expenditures.
Introduction
Two years ago, Ter Rele (1997a, b) employed generational
accounting to explore the intergenerational effects and
the sustainability of public sector arrangements in the
Netherlands. The first purpose of this article is to update
Ter Rele’s calculations.1 In particular, it employs more
recent demographic projections and updated estimates
for the stock of public capital. Furthermore, it uses 2000
instead of 1998 as the base year for the extrapolation of
fiscal trends. A second purpose of this article is to outline
three extensions to the standard methodology of gener-
ational accounting developed by Auerbach, Gokhale and
Kotlikoff (1991).
We first briefly describe the standard methodology for
generational accounting and apply this methodology to
the public finances in the Netherlands. We then present
three extensions to the standard methodology. These
extensions are, first, the incorporation of prospective
changes in the economic environment; second, the assign-
ment of the benefits of government purchases to gener-
ations; and, third, the translation of the generational
accounts into government budgets. Subsequently, we
explore various policy reforms aimed at establishing gen-
erational balance, and investigate how sensitive the results
are with respect to some important assumptions.
Figure 1 Age profile of net taxes, 2000
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beyond 2000, we extrapolate net fiscal benefits on the
assumption that age-specific net fiscal benefits grow at
the same rate as productivity, which is assumed to be 2
percent (in real terms). This is in line with the standard
generational accounting methodology. According to this
methodology, unless detailed government forecasts for
aggregate taxes and transfers are available, the fiscal ben-
efits and burdens for each age group are assumed to grow
at the rate of productivity growth. This extrapolation is
considered to be a reasonable approximation of present
public arrangements.
For each current generation, the figures for age-spe-
cific net taxation can be aggregated over the rest of the
life into a single present-value figure. Doing so, we arrive
at the figures contained in the ‘base-case’ column in table
1, which are based on a real discount rate (or real interest
rate) of 4 percent. These figures reflect the age profile of
net taxes in figure 1. In present-value terms, young cur-
rent generations contribute to the government budget,
while the older generations enjoy net benefits during the
rest of their life.
Future generations
Given the aggregate net fiscal burden for current gener-
ations, the intertemporal government budget constraint
determines the aggregate net discounted payments
required of future generations. This aggregate burden is
distributed over all future generations under the assump-
tion that the per capita lifetime net tax payment of mem-
bers of successive generations rises at the rate of pro-
ductivity growth. Hence, the ratio of lifetime payment to
lifetime income is the same for all future generations.
Measure I: The level of the tax burden
Generational accounting yields three important measures.
The first one is the level of the net tax burden (the tax bur-
den minus public transfers) on future generations. As
described above, it is found residually from the intertem-
poral government budget constraint and the net taxes that
are imposed on currently living generations under pre-
sent public arrangements. The level of the net tax bur-
den on future generations is highly sensitive to the level
of government purchases because generational accounts
do not assign the incidence of these public purchases to
generations. Moreover, the level measure is rather sen-
sitive to the allocation of benefits over the life cycle, which
is sometimes rather arbitrary.3
Measure II: The difference in tax burdens between the
newly born and future generations
The second measure is the difference between the life-
time tax burden on current newborns (the so-called ‘newly
born,’ who are the youngest members of the current gen-
erations) and the lifetime tax burden on future genera-
tions. The tax burdens on these two generations are com-
parable because they both apply to an entire lifetime.
Furthermore, the difference between these two lifetime
tax burdens measures the sustainability of public arrange-
ments (see box sustainability of public arrangements).4
In the base case (see the ‘base-case’ column of table
1), current policies are not sustainable because future gen-
erations bear a lifetime tax burden (of E 189,400) that
exceeds the lifetime tax burden faced by the newly born
(of E 108,400). The difference in the lifetime tax burden
between newly born and future generations amounts to
11.9% of the present value of an average person’s lifetime
income.
Sustainability of public arrangements 
If the net lifetime burden of the newly born (which depends
on current arrangements unconstrained by the govern-
ment budget constraint) coincides with the net lifetime
burden on future generations (which is determined resid-
ually from the government budget constraint), the net tax
burden implied by current arrangements (as measured
by the net burden on the newly born) is consistent with
the net tax burden required by the intertemporal budget
constraint of the government (as measured by the net bur-
den on future generations). Hence, public arrangements
are sustainable. However, if the newly born face a smaller
net tax burden than future generations do, then current
arrangements impose a net contribution that is smaller
than the amount that would be required for sustainabil-
ity. Accordingly, public arrangements are too ‘generous’
and will have to be adjusted in the future to meet the gov-
ernment budget constraint. The longer this adjustment is
delayed, the larger will be the required additional net
tax burden on future generations. 
Measure III: The required immediate adjustment of policy
Another way to measure the sustainability of the public
arrangements is to determine the permanent and imme-
diate change in some tax or transfer instrument that is
required to make arrangements sustainable (i.e. to equalise
the net fiscal burdens facing the newly born and future
generations). The advantage of this measure is that it does
not employ the unrealistic assumption that current gen-
erations fully escape the required adjustment of an unsus-
tainable policy. Indeed, depending on the specific policy
measure adopted, the burden will be shared between cur-
rent and future generations. In view of this advantage,
this paper focuses mainly on this third measure. In doing
so, we employ indirect taxes as the policy instrument that
is adjusted. According to this measure, an immediate tax
increase of 4.2% of GDP is required to arrive at a sus-
tainable fiscal policy (see table 1).
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Accounting for changes in the economic environment 
The standard method extrapolates the current age profile
of net taxes contained in figure 1. Hence, it implicitly
assumes that the currently observed rate of labour force
participation remains constant in the future. This assump-
tion is not appropriate for the Netherlands. Whereas this
country has traditionally featured a low female participa-
tion rate, the participation rate of women has started to
rise sharply over the last two decades. Indeed, this devel-
opment is one of the main factors behind the relatively
rapid growth of employment in the Netherlands. The female
participation rate is expected to continue to increase fur-
ther as those cohorts of women reach their prime earn-
ing years who enjoyed a better education and have a
different view on their role in society than older women.
Also the participation rate of older males is expected to
increase in the future.
A higher participation rate strengthens the public
finances by broadening the tax base. To account for this
important effect, variant 1 assumes that taxes paid by a
particular age group depend not only on labour produc-
tivity and the number of people in that group but also
on the projected labour force participation rate of the age
group involved. Table 2 contains CPB projections of these
participation rates in 2020 for three alternative scenarios
and compares these to the corresponding participation
rates in 1995. The projections for the base case imply that
the participation rate of those between 20 and 64 years of
age will rise by about 6.4%-points between 1995 and 2020.
The higher participation rate reduces the generational
imbalance substantially. The tax burden on future gener-
ations exceeds that on the newly born by only E 24,000
(compared to E 81,100 in the standard case). The required
immediate increase in indirect taxes falls by 3.1%-points
to only 1.1% of GDP (see table 1).
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Table 1 Present value of future net tax payment per capita
Base case Variant 1 Variant 2* Variant 3* Benchmark*
(standard) (including (including (including (assigning
increasing higher three factors benefits)
participation) pension narrowing
incomes) the tax base)
Thousands of euros (in present value)
Net taxes paid by: 
80-year olds –112.2 –112.2 –110.8 –110.9 –139.2
60-year olds – 54.7 – 54.5 – 46.1 – 47.2 –114.1
40-year olds –147.4 –164.8 –174.0 –166.1 – 59.5
20-year olds –243.0 –277.1 –284.2 –274.4 –123.4
newly born –108.4 –135.0 –140.1 –135.3 – 43.2
future generations –189.4 –159.0 –146.6 –156.6 – 29.0 
Generational imbalance:
in thousands of euros – 81.1 – 24.0 – 6.5 – 21.4 – 14.3
as a percentage of lifetime income – 11.9 – 3.5 – 1.0 – 3.2 – 2.1
required adjustment of indirect
taxes (% GDP) – 4.2 – 1.1 – 0.3 – 1.0 – 0.7
*The variants are cumulative. Hence, in addition to the changes in parenthesis, each variant includes also the changes included in the previous variant.




20-34 73.1 76.6 75.8 77.2
35-49 72.0 79.2 84.1 86.2
50-64 37.7 43.7 55.3 60.5
Total 64.1 65.3 70.5 73.9
Source: CBS/CPB (1997)
* Adjusted for rise in part-time employment.22
A second important factor requiring an adjustment of
the age profile is an expected increase in private pension
incomes. Public pension benefits in the Netherlands are
flat (i.e. unrelated to income), so that the public benefit
level is relatively low for middle- and high-income earn-
ers. For these income groups, collective labour agree-
ments supplement the public benefits with compulsory
occupational pension provisions. These provisions are
financed by funded pensions funds, which have accu-
mulated sizable financial assets. The occupational pen-
sion funds have not yet reached a steady state, but will
mature during the coming decades. Hence, present rates
of pension saving will result in higher pension incomes
in the future than currently observed. This will broaden
the tax base because retirement benefits are subject to
the personal income tax and indirect taxes are levied on
consumption out of these benefits. 
Variant 2 (see table 1) reveals that the associated increase
in tax payments alleviates the generational imbalance fur-
ther; future generations now pay only E 6,500 more in
taxes than the newly born do. The required immediate
increase in indirect taxes drops further to only 0.3% of
GDP .
Whereas the increase in labour force participation and
the maturing of pension funds are expected to broaden
the tax base, three other developments are projected to
narrow the tax base.5 These three factors are an expected
rise of tax deductible pension premiums, an expected
moderation of the rise of earnings with age, and an
expected more moderate rise of revenues from corporate
taxes than implicitly assumed in the standard generational
accounting methodology.6Variant 3 accounts for these
three developments, which reduce the improvement in
the generational imbalance brought about by higher pen-
sion incomes and a higher participation rate. According
to the policy adjustment measure, indirect taxes need to
be raised by 1.0% of GDP in variant 3 to ensure that cur-
rent fiscal policy is sustainable.
Assigning the benefits from government purchases 
The standard practice in generational accounting does
not assign the benefits of government purchases to gen-
erations, and thus does not distinguish between public
consumption and public investment. This section modi-
fies this practice. In particular, we assume that all currently
living generations enjoy the same (per capita) benefits
from both government consumption and the public cap-
ital stock. Gross public investments are extrapolated in
line with the growth of GDP . In our view, this variant best
reflects the impact of future developments on the inter-
generational stance of fiscal policy. We therefore call it the
benchmark case.7
The alternative treatment of government purchases
improves the generational imbalance (see the benchmark
case in table 1). The main reason is that the current level
of public investment exceeds the level required to keep
the public capital-GDP ratio constant. Hence, this latter
ratio rises over time so that future generations benefit
more from public capital (relative to GDP) than present
generations do.
With the assignment of the incidence of government
purchases, the net lifetime tax burden on future genera-
tions measures the fiscal liabilities shifted to future gen-
erations. Table 1 (last column) reveals that future gener-
ations receive a net benefit of the government of E29,000.
The imbalance measure is reduced to E 14,300, and the
increase of indirect taxation required to achieve genera-
tional balance falls to 0.7% of GDP . This policy adjustment
for the benchmark is slightly smaller than the 1.0% of GDP
that was found by  Ter Rele (1997ab) for the correspond-
ing case.
Transforming the generational accounts into government
accounts
Transforming generational accounts into future govern-
ment budgets is useful for a number of reasons. First, by
making explicit the implied size of future budget items,
it enhances the transparency of generational accounting
exercises. Second, it provides a link with the more tradi-
tional tools for analysing fiscal policies, such as the bud-
get deficit and government debt. This helps to transform
policy objectives with respect to generational distribution
into more concrete fiscal targets. Third, it allows policy-
makers to make explicit the trade-offs between genera-
tional distribution and other objectives of fiscal policy,
such as meeting the EMU fiscal criteria or reducing the
exposure of the budget to fluctuations in interest rates.
Table 3 shows the government budget for selected years
if indirect taxes are raised immediately (by 0.7 % of GDP)
to ensure sustainable public finances in the benchmark
case. Ageing causes spending on public old-age pensions
(AOW) and health care to rise substantially. Expressed as
a percentage of GDP , public pension benefits rise from
5.2% in 1998 to 7.0% in 2020 and 9.4% in 2040. Health care
expenditures increase from 8.7% in 1998 to 10.1% in 2020
and 12.8% in 2040.
Until 2020, increases in public spending are mitigated
by the effect of the increase of labour participation on GDP .
Moreover, the tax burden rises, due to the maturing of
pension funds and the resulting increase of taxable pen-
sion incomes relative to the size of the economy. The early
implementation of a sustainable policy implies that, until
2020, the tax burden rises more than expenditures do.
This leads to a sharp reduction of government debt and
interest payments, which helps to create the fiscal room
for absorbing the increasing budgetary costs of the age-
ing of the population in later years. By first reducing gov-
ernment debt and interest payments in order to create
room for the later rise of the age-related expenditures,
policymakers would transfer some of the costs of the pop-
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of the old-age benefits and of health care outweigh the
rise in revenues, causing the fiscal deficit to rise again.
Figure 2 shows how the fiscal deficit develops if pre-
sent policies are continued in the benchmark case. This
would lead to a fiscal surplus by 2006, but would even-
tually result in rising deficits when ageing causes expen-
ditures to increase sharply. Figure 2 contains also the
course of the fiscal deficit if indirect taxes are raised in
2000 to ensure fiscal sustainability. It shows that a sur-
plus would have to be maintained for several decades in
order to reduce the debt service so as to create sufficient
budgetary room for covering the additional government
spending when the ageing of the population occurs.
Apart from raising government saving by an immedi-
ate and permanent tax increase, sustainability can also
be established in alternative ways, for instance by reduc-
ing the rise of age-related expenditures or by strength-
ening the tax base through higher labour participation.
Figure 2 shows the course of the deficit if expenditures
on old-age benefits and health care are curtailed so as to
render the system sustainable. This requires that the growth
rate of these expenditures be slowed down by 0.2% per
year until 2020. Figure 2 also reveals the future deficits if
an increase in labour participation exactly ensures sus-
tainability. The implied future course of fiscal deficits is
robust to the various alternatives.
Table 3 and Figure 2 contain the same message as their
counterparts in Ter Rele (1997a, b). The main difference
between the present estimates and those in Ter Rele 
(1997a, b) is that the present estimates imply a smaller
rise of age-related costs because of less severe ageing of
the population in the most recent demographic projec-
tions. Health and old-age benefits increase by 8.3%-points
between 1998 and 2040 and by 7.3%-points between 1998
and 2060. The corresponding figures in Ter Rele (1997a, b)
were 10.2%-points and 8.9%-points, respectively.
Establishing generational balance
Table 4 contains various policy adjustments that ensure
sustainable public finances in the benchmark case. 
All policy measures are permanent and implemented in
2000. The required policy adjustments are modest; an
adjustment in one of these budget items of between 0.6%
to 0.8% of GDP would suffice (see the second column of table
4). These figures are all about 0.3%-points lower than in
CPB Report 1997/3. 
The required policy adjustments for the various mea-
sures are of similar magnitude when expressed in terms
of GDP - irrespective of the age profile of the various bud-
get items. Table 4, however, shows that the various mea-
sures yield quite different effects on various generations.
In particular, future generations benefit most from changes
in budget items affecting the end of the life cycle, such as
health and transfer payments. Changes in these budget
items also have the smallest (negative) effect on the newly
born because the effect of these measures is discounted
more heavily. Hence, both the future generations and the
newly born (the youngest of the current generations)
are relatively well-off under these measures, as most of
the burden is borne by the oldest of the current generations.
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Table 3 Government accounts under a sustainable policy, 1998 - 2060
1998 2000 2020 2040 2060
%GDP
Health 8.7 9.2 10.1 12.8 12.6
Old-age benefits 5.2 5.3 7.0 9.4 8.6
Other expenditures 31.1 31.3 30.2 31.5 31.1
Interest payments 4.8 4.3 0.9 –0.3 1.2
Total public expenditures 49.8 50.1 48.2 53.4 53.5
Total revenues 49.1 49.3 51.5 53.2 52.4
Fiscal deficit 0.7 0.8 –3.3 0.2 1.1
Figure 2 Budget deficit, 1998 - 2060
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The benchmark case employs a base-case assumption for
the expected growth of labour force participation. However,
in view of the considerable uncertainty surrounding this
variable, some sensitivity analysis is called for. CPB has
constructed two alternative scenarios for the future devel-
opment of the participation rate in the labour force (see
table 2). All three scenarios involve an increase in partic-
ipation. Whereas the ‘low’ case projects only accumulated
2% growth until 2020, the ‘high’ case involves an accu-
mulated growth of 15 %. This compares to 10 % growth
in the base case.
Table 5 reveals that the generational imbalance is rather
sensitive to labour supply. Indeed, in the scenario fea-
turing the highest labour participation, the additional
labour supply dominates the effect of ageing so that future
generations actually contribute less to the government
budget than the newly born do. This confirms that a high
level of labour force participation is a crucial factor in
ensuring sustainable public finances.
Demographic developments
In performing sensitivity analysis with respect to demo-
graphic developments, we employ alternative demo-
graphic scenarios provided by Statistics Netherlands. In
particular, we construct two variants with rather extreme
assumptions for the ageing of the population. To analyse
the impact of substantial ageing, the first (‘grey’) variant
combines the assumption of low birth rates with that of
a high life expectancy. The other (‘green’) variant consid-
ers the other extreme case by assuming that high birth
rates coincide with low life expectancy. Table 6 contains
the effects of these alternative assumptions on the elderly
dependency ratio. The two last columns of Table 7 show
that the consequences of alternative demographic assump-
tions for the generational accounts are substantial. In the
‘grey’ variant (third column of table 7), indirect taxes must
be raised by 2.4% of GDP to ensure sustainability. In the
99/3
B B P P C C
REPORT
Table 4 Possible measures to ensure generational balance
Effect on net lifetime tax of:
measure future newly born 30-year olds 60-year olds
generations
%GDP thousands of euros
Defence, General government – 0.8 – 7 7 5 2
Education – 0.8 – 3 11 0 0
Health – 0.6 – 10 5 5 6
Transfer payment net of taxes – 0.7 – 9 5 6 5
Income tax –0.7 – 8 6 7 1
Indirect taxes – 0.7 – 8 6 6 3
Table 5 Sensitivity analysis: participation rate
low participation Benchmark high participation
Next taxes paid by:
newly born – 55.2 – 43.2 – 30.5
future generations – 12.2 – 29.0 – 46.9
Generational imbalance
in thousands of euros – 42.9 – 14.2 – 16.4
as a percentage of lifetime income –  6.8 –  2.1 – 2.3
required adjustment of indirect taxes –  2.1 –  0.7 – 0.7
(%GDP)
Table 6 Elderly dependency ratios,* 1998-2060
base case alternative assumptions
low birth rate, high life high birth rate, low life
expectancy expectancy
1998 0.22 0.22 0.22
2020 0.32 0.35 0.29
2040 0.43 0.52 0.35
2060 0.39 0.52 0.29
* The number of 65+ as a percentage of the 20 - 64 year olds. Source: Statistics Netherlands‘green’ variant (fourth column of Table 7), current fiscal
policy is sustainable, as future generations benefit more
from the public finances than the newly born do.
Conclusions
The analysis in this paper indicates that the ageing of
the population, labour force participation rates, and funded
private pension schemes are the main factors determin-
ing the intergenerational stance and sustainability of the
Dutch public finances. Higher expected labour force par-
ticipation (especially of women) and additional taxed ben-
efits from private pension schemes help to offset the
adverse effect of ageing on the public finances. As a result,
a relatively small tax increase is sufficient to ensure that
the Dutch public finances are sustainable in the bench-
mark case. However, since the rise in labour force partic-
ipation precedes the bulk of the ageing, the government
will have to run sizable fiscal surpluses in the next decades
to create the budgetary room for higher age-related spend-
ing later on. Through the active use of public debt policy,
some of the fiscal costs associated with ageing are trans-
ferred to the present. The sensitivity analyses revealed
that the calculations are rather sensitive to future labour
force participation. Indeed, the health of the public finances
appears to depend heavily on a well functioning private
sector.
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Notes
1This article draws heavily on Bovenberg and Ter Rele (1999) which provides
more detail on the calculations. 
2For a more elaborate exposition of the methodology, see Auerbach, Gokdale
and Kotlikoff (1991), and Auerbach and Kotlikoff  (1999). 
3It is not clear, for example, whether child allowances should be allocated
to the parents or the children.
4Another advantage of the differencemeasure compared to the levelmea-
sure is that the difference measure is less sensitive to the level of govern-
ment purchases and the allocation of net benefits over the life cycle, which
is often rather arbitrary (see the previous footnote).
5Bovenberg and Ter Rele (1999) elaborate on these factors.
6 In particular, these revenues are expected to rise in line with GDP rather
than with Dutch shareholdership. 
7 Ter Rele (1997a) provides a more detailed description of the methodology
and data employed in the benchmark case. 
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Table 7 Sensitivity analysis: demographics
Benchmark ‘grey’ variant ‘green’ variant
(middle birth rate, middle
life expectancy)
thousands of euros
Net taxes paid by:
newly born – 43 – 61 – 24
future generations – 29 – 1–  3 8
Generational imbalance:
in thousands of euros -– 14 -– 62 – 14
as a percentage of lifetime income -- – 2.1 -- – 9.2 - –2.1
required adjustment of indirect taxes -- – 0.7 -- – 2.4 –0.8
(%GDP)